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How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 
 the Military Commissions 
Joshua L. Dratel ∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Guantánamo Bay military commissions have generated con-
troversy since their inception.  Fundamental threshold issues that are 
never considered in traditional court systems—such as whether de-
fense lawyers could participate in any manner consistent with ethical 
obligations—arose with regularity in an invented, hybrid, ad hoc ap-
paratus that contained just enough process to provide a patina of 
fairness, but that was designed and operated to ensure convictions. 
That reality can, of course, be discouraging to lawyers aiming to 
litigate on behalf of clients in ordinary circumstances.  In the Guan-
tánamo Bay military commissions, though, the problems were aggra-
vated by several factors, including (a) the client’s general distrust of 
the United States; (b) the treatment (more often maltreatment) of 
the client at the hands of the United States prior to commencement 
of the attorney-client relationship; (c) the client’s lengthy isolation at 
Guantánamo Bay; (d) the lack of applicability of any particular body 
of law, whether U.S. federal, U.S. military, the laws of armed conflict 
(LOAC), including the Geneva Convention, international law, or in-
ternational humanitarian law (IHL);
1
 (f) the geographic and logistic-
al remoteness of Guantánamo Bay; and (g) the continued politiciza-
tion of even the most mundane aspect of detainee affairs and of the 
conduct of the military commissions. 
 
 ∗  President of Dratel & Mysliwiec, P.C., in New York City.  B.A., Columbia Col-
lege; J.D., Harvard Law School. 
 1 See, e.g., Danielle Keats & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic 
Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1486 (2011) (“[T]he Department of De-
fense located many detainees in the War on Terror at Guantánamo Bay, which it 
viewed as a legal ‘no man’s land’ where neither American law nor any other coun-
try’s law was supposed to apply.”); Michael J.D. Sweeney, Detention at Guantánamo Bay: 
A Linguistic Challenge to Law, 30 HUM. RTS. 15, 15 (2003)(“[T]he Bush administration 
has refused to recognize the detainees under international law and has avoided the 
legal obligations.”).  
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Notwithstanding those challenges, it would be a mistake to con-
sider the experienced criminal defense practitioner at a complete 
disadvantage when practicing in these military commissions.  Indeed, 
as the first U.S. civilian attorney to visit a client detainee at Guantá-
namo Bay—David Hicks, in early January 2004—and as David’s civi-
lian defense counsel in the first, second, and third iterations of the 
Guantánamo Bay military commissions, my thirty years as a criminal 
defense attorney practicing in the federal and state courts in the 
United States afforded me several important advantages in those pro-
ceedings. 
As detailed below, those advantages can be categorized broadly 
as follows: 
(a) the advantage of being the first private defense lawyer in-
volved in the military commissions;
2
 
(b) the advantage of experience litigating in a properly consti-
tuted, legitimate criminal court system (i.e., the U.S. federal system 
operating in Article III courts);
3
 
(c)  the advantage of being a criminal defense lawyer in the mili-
tary commission system with the rights, albeit limited, attendant to 
the criminal process therein, rather than as a civil plaintiff’s lawyer in 
the habeas corpus context, which provided the detention authorities 
substantially more control over attorney-client relations and conduct;
4
 
(d)  the advantage of familiarity with the rules and procedures 
governing the use of classified information and evidence in the fed-
eral courts;
5
 
(e) the advantage of experience litigating—including investiga-
tion, preparation, and trial—complex, document-intensive, multi-
 
 2 See discussion infra Part II. 
 3 See discussion infra Part III.  Such courts are denominated “Article III” courts 
because their authority derives from Article III of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. 
art. III, §§ 1, 2.  Judges in such courts are appointed by the President and confirmed 
by the Senate.  Id. art. II, § 2.  They possess lifetime tenure.  Id. art. III, § 1.  District 
court judges preside at the trial level.  District Courts, U. S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/DistrictC
ourts.aspx (last visited Sept. 15, 2011).  Circuit court of appeals judges are at the in-
termediate appellate level.  Courts of Appeals, U. S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/CourtofA
ppeals.aspx (last visited Sept. 15, 2011).  The United States Supreme Court consti-
tutes the ultimate legal authority, and its opinions are binding on all federal and 
state judicial systems.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 693 (3d ed. 1996).  In addition, 
the criminal justice system under Article III courts is based on constitutional provi-
sions, statutes, and rules, and not on the common law.   
 4 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 5 See discussion infra Part V. 
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defendant cases, which are exceedingly rare in the ordinary military 
court-martial system;
6
 
(f) the advantage of adopting a client-oriented, rather than 
cause-oriented, approach that is second nature for criminal defense 
attorneys in the U.S.;
7
 and 
(g)  the advantage of having a global audience paying extraordi-
nary attention to the proceedings at the Guantánamo Bay military 
commissions, thereby providing an alternate and continuing source 
of pressure on the government.
8
 
Each and all of these advantages provided civilian defense coun-
sel at least some openings to perform their craft in a manner capable 
of leveling, at least partially (and to the greatest extent possible), the 
military commissions’ playing field that was so deliberately tilted in 
favor of the prosecution. 
II. THE ADVANTAGES OF BEING FIRST 
When I agreed to represent David Hicks in December 2003, the 
government was eager to facilitate my involvement and my ability to 
visit David at Guantánamo Bay.  The rumor was that the government 
expected David to cooperate with the prosecution, to enter a plea of 
guilty, and to assist with other investigations and prosecutions.  David 
would have made a perfect prosecution witness in some respects—an 
English-speaking native Westerner, an Australian who was not re-
sponsible for any violent conduct or terrorist activity—and thereby 
provided the nascent military commission system with some legitima-
cy. 
That incentive for the government provided me with more leve-
rage than I might have possessed otherwise.  The initial hurdles were 
the terms of my formal entry as David’s civilian counsel.
9
  The military 
commission process, which at the time was essentially devoid of for-
 
 6 See discussion infra Part VI. 
 7 See discussion infra Part VII. 
 8 See discussion infra Part VIII.  
 9 David already had detailed—the military’s term for having been assigned—
military counsel (USMC), Major Michael D. Mori and an Australian Foreign Attorney 
Consultant (FAC), Steven Kenney, both of whom had already visited David once at 
Guantánamo Bay prior to my engagement as David’s U.S. civilian defense lawyer.  
Joseph Margulies, Esq., one of the architects of the entire Guantánamo Bay ha-
beas strategy, had represented David, who was a plaintiff in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 
466 (2004).  However, it was determined that Mr. Margulies could not represent Da-
vid in the military commissions due to his multiple representation of detainees in Ra-
sul.  As a result, I was asked to be David’s civilian defense counsel.  
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mal rules or procedures, did, however, have protocols for defense 
counsel’s admission into the military commission system.
10
 
A. The Proposed Conditions for Civilian Defense Counsel Participation 
The principal document was called “Annex B,” which set forth 
the terms and conditions of representation and required counsel’s 
sworn agreement to abide by those terms and conditions.
11
  In its ini-
tial form, however, Annex B was unacceptable.
12
  In August 2003, the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) ap-
proved Ethics Opinion 03-04 issued by its Ethics Advisory Commit-
tee.
13
  The opinion adopted the position that “it is unethical for a 
criminal defense lawyer to represent a person accused before these 
military commissions because the conditions imposed upon defense 
counsel before these commissions make it impossible for counsel to 
provide adequate or ethical representation.”
14
 
The NACDL opinion added that “[d]efense counsel cannot con-
tract away his or her client’s rights, including the right to zealous ad-
vocacy, before a military commission, which is what the government 
seeks in Annex B, although it says it is not, in spite of the clear lan-
guage of the MCI’s.”
15
  The NACDL opinion did “not condemn crim-
inal defense lawyers who undertake to represent persons accused be-
fore military commissions because some may feel an obligation to do 
so.”
16
  However, the opinion did impose upon such lawyers an obliga-
tion 
to raise, with knowledge of the serious and unconscionable risks 
involved in violating Annex B, including possible indictment, 
every conceivable good faith argument concerning the jurisdic-
tion of the military commission, the legality of denial of applica-
 
 10 See Dep’t of Def., Military Commission Instruction No. 5, Qualification of Civi-
lian Def. Counsel, Annex B (2003) [hereinafter Annex B 2003], available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Feb2006/d20060217MCI5.pdf. 
 11 Id. 
 12 NACDL Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 03-04, at 1 (2003) [hereinafter NACDL 
Opinion], available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/search.aspx?term=nacdl%20ethics%20advisory%20committee
%20opinion.  
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id.  A “MCI” was a Military Commission Instruction in the initial Guantánamo 
commissions system in 2004.  MCI’s were designed to provide guidance to practition-
ers in the commission system.  See, e.g., Dep’t of Def., Military Comm’n Instruction 
No. 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/may2003/d20030430milcominstno1.pdf. 
 16 NACDL Opinion, supra note 12, at 1. 
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tion of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), interna-
tional treaties, and due process of law, including resort to the civi-
lian courts of the United States to determine whether the pro-
ceedings are constitutional.
17
 
The NACDL opinion identified several provisions of Annex B 
and the Military Commission Instructions, which it incorporated, that 
were objectionable, including: 
(1)the requirement that civilian defense counsel acknowledge 
and agree to monitoring of attorney-client communications;
18
 
(2)the requirement that civilian defense counsel acknowledge 
and agree to be barred from certain proceedings, despite having the 
requisite security clearance;
19
 
(3)the requirement that civilian defense counsel “ensure the 
commission proceedings are counsel’s primary duty and no matter in 
counsel’s private practice or personal life can interfere with the 
commission’s proceedings”;
20
 and 
(4)the requirement that “once proceedings have begun, [civilian 
defense] counsel will not leave the site of the proceedings without 
approval of the Appointing Authority or Presiding Officer.”
21
 
In addition, Annex B also unreasonably limited the scope of the 
defense team and the ability of defense counsel to share information 
with appropriate consultants, experts, and witnesses.
22
  As the NACDL 
opinion protested, the individual and cumulative effect of these pro-
visions was that “full zealous representation likely will not and cannot 
be achieved because of severe and unreasonable limits on counsel 
imposed by the government, in violation of the UCMJ and treaties 
the United States has signed guaranteeing rights to the accused be-
fore these commissions.”
23
  As a result, the NACDL opinion con-
cluded that “[c]riminal defense lawyers are severely disadvantaged in 
their duties to represent their clients,” and that “[t]he loss of rights 
can only help insure unjust and unreliable convictions.”
24
 
The NACDL opinion, however, constituted a powerful statement 
of an attorney’s duty in the military commissions, and a basis for re-
fusing to sign Annex B as initially presented.  That unwavering insti-
 
 17 Id.(citation omitted). 
 18 Id. at 3.  
 19 Id. at 14.  
 20 Id. at 15. 
 21 Id. 
 22 See Annex B 2003, supra 10, at  II(C); NACDL Opinion, supra note 12, at 23. 
 23 NACDL Opinion, supra note 12, at 1. 
 24 Id. at 1–2. 
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tutional support for civilian defense counsel, coupled with the gov-
ernment’s desire to get the commission process under way (and to 
facilitate David’s anticipated cooperation), provided me with substan-
tial leverage to resist those intolerable conditions. 
In addition, the fact that no one else had yet agreed to those 
terms—as I was the first civilian defense counsel to visit Guantánamo, 
and therefore to confront Annex B in practice—provided me with a 
clean slate that enhanced that leverage.  Insisting on adherence to 
the NACDL opinion, I informed military commission officials that I 
would not sign Annex B unless it was modified to meet the NACDL 
opinion’s objections. 
In response, commission officials obliged by eliminating or 
amending the offending sections.  Consequently, the monitoring 
provision was removed entirely, and the other unpalatable terms were 
revised to reflect federal court standards (i.e., slavish devotion to the 
commissions at the expense of all other professional and personal 
engagements was no longer required, and the contours of the de-
fense team were the same as those in federal court, as were the stan-
dards for adjournments of proceedings).
25
  In addition, as in federal 
court, the amended Annex B permitted civilian defense counsel to 
object to any ex parte proceedings.
26
 
After commission officials prepared that version of Annex B, and 
I executed it, I was officially David’s civilian defense counsel in the 
military commissions.  By April 2004, Annex B had been revised to re-
flect all of those changes.
27
  As a result, all subsequent civilian defense 
lawyers in the commissions were spared the most onerous provisions 
of Annex B that the NACDL opinion had identified. 
B. The Flexibility of Operating in a System Prior to Promulgation of 
Rules 
Being involved in the military commissions and interacting with 
the Guantánamo Bay detention operation prior to any other civilian 
counsel provided flexibility in a system for which rules had not yet 
been formulated, much less implemented.  The absence of rules al-
lowed us to gain improvements in David’s conditions at Guantánamo 
that were not possible once formal procedures were set in place, 
 
 25 Compare Dep’t of Def., Military Commission Instruction No. 5, Qualification of 
Civilian Def. Counsel, Annex B (2004) [hereinafter Annex B 2004], available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Feb2004/d20040206milcominstno5annB.pdf, with 
Annex B 2003, supra note 10.   
 26 Annex B 2004, supra note 25, at  II.E.1.ing to, please provide the proper  
 27 See Annex B 2004, supra note 25. 
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which occurred once a regular stream of lawyers began visiting the 
base.  We also enjoyed greater freedom of movement and less interfe-
rence with materials we sought to review and leave with David.  Dur-
ing that early period we were able, in many respects, to capitalize on 
the rules vacuum and correspondingly customize David’s conditions 
for his benefit. 
Part of our success in gaining improvements was attributable to 
the military officials directly in charge of lawyer access and legal is-
sues, who were accessible and in most cases agreeable.  Also, when 
Major General Jay Hood assumed command of the detention opera-
tion early in 2004,
28
 he afforded us personal access to him and his 
staff to lodge complaints or raise issues.  Military personnel, however, 
were regularly rotated from assignment at Guantánamo Bay. Succes-
sive military officers were progressively less interested in accommo-
dating counsel or facilitating their relationships with their clients and 
more interested in creating bureaucratic obstacles that did not exist 
at the outset. 
III. EXPERIENCE LITIGATING IN A PROPERLY CONSTITUTED, 
LEGITIMATE CRIMINAL COURT SYSTEM 
Anyone experienced in litigating in federal court would instantly 
note its contrast with the Guantánamo military commissions, especial-
ly back in 2004.
29
  As a threshold matter, presence of military defense 
 
 28 Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Drops Post in Pakistan for Top General, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 
2008, at A1. 
 29 Two sets of hearings were conducted in 2004.  At the first, in August 2004, four 
defendants, including David, were arraigned on the charges against them.  U.S. Pre-
pares for Guantánamo Arraignments, USA TODAY (Aug. 23, 2004), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-08-23-gitmo-trial_x.htm.  At the 
second, in October 2004, certain pretrial motions were argued, and voir dire of the 
commission members commenced.  See Dep’t of Def., Challenges for Cause Decision 
No. 2004-001, at 1 (2004) [hereinafter Challenges for Cause Decision], available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Oct2004/d20041021panel.pdf; ANGUS MARTYN, 
PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL., PROGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY COMMISSION TRIAL 
OF DAVID HICKS 1 (2005), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rn/2004-
05/05rn33.pdf.  Illustrating the lack of administrative planning that regularly af-
flicted the commissions, two members of the panel that heard those motions were 
subsequently disqualified by the Appointing Authority on defense’s motion based on 
their voir dire answers.  Id.  Also, on the second day of the October 2004 proceed-
ings, a federal judge invalidated the commissions in part, and issued a restraining 
order enjoining the proceedings.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 173–74 
(D.D.C. 2004), rev’d, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d and remanded, 548 U.S. 557 
(2006) (“[U]nless and until the rules for Military Commissions . . . are amended . . . 
petitioner may not be tried by Military Commission . . . .”).  The commission pro-
ceedings against David did not formally resume until months after the Supreme 
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counsel made importation of certain military justice conventions 
(e.g., scripted, formalistic pretrial conferences, extensive off-the-
record contact between the parties and the “court”)
30
 relatively pain-
less.  The military commissions’ lack of structure, however, and the 
chaos that ensued at every proceeding, was glaring in comparison 
with federal court practice. 
For example, the first time a defendant asked to proceed pro se 
(and thus represent himself), which occurred during the first day of 
commission hearings, the proceedings came to a screeching and ab-
rupt halt.
31
  Similarly, the unprecedented composition of the commis-
sion—its members, predominantly non-lawyers, 
32
 were all equals, de-
ciding all issues of fact and law—was completely unworkable.  The 
four non-lawyers on David’s prospective commission—the fifth mem-
ber was a retired military judge re-activated specifically for assignment 
to the commissions
33
—simply lacked the capacity to analyze or decide 
legal issues in any coherent, consistent, or competent fashion.  Un-
trained in the law and with very limited exposure to court-martial 
proceedings, they could not grasp fundamental legal concepts such 
as jurisdiction (or more accurately, its limits), ex post facto, the dan-
gers of hearsay, and/or the relevance of expert testimony, which they 
rejected altogether when offered by the defense. 
Problems also arose with respect to the scope of voir dire, in-
cluding whether certain portions should be classified,
34
 as well as with 
the quality of translators, the confidentiality of defense counsel’s in-
 
Court’s 2006 decision in Hamdan and the subsequent passage of the Military Com-
missions Act of 2006.  
 30 The initial commission proceedings did not designate a “judge,” as all panel 
members acted as both judge and jury on all issues—factual, legal, and evidentiary.  
Bruce Zagaris, Controversy Over U.S. Guantánamo Detentions Continues, 20 INT’L 
ENFORCEMENT LAW REP. 12, 12 (2004).  One panel member, however, was a retired 
military judge brought back to active duty for service in the military commissions, 
and he served as the “judge” for purposes of organizing the proceedings and com-
municating with counsel for both parties.  Scott L. Silliman, On Military Commissions, 
37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 529, 537 n.50 (2005). 
 31 See Challenges for Cause Decision, supra note 29, at 1 n.1.  See generally MARK P. 
DENBEAUX ET AL., THE GUANTÁNAMO LAWYERS: INSIDE A PRISON OUTSIDE THE LAW 185 
(2009) (discussing how “ill prepared” the government was to deal with a pro se de-
tainee).  
 32 Toni Locy, Guantánamo Hearings Start Today, USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 2004, at 4A 
(noting that, from the panel members, only retired Army Colonel Peter Brownback 
had legal training).  
 33 See Silliman, supra note 30, at 537 n.50. 
 34 Ultimately, it was the general consensus of all involved that significant portions 
(if not all) of the voir dire that were conducted in classified session should have been 
held in open court, while other responses from prospective panel members made in 
open court perhaps should have been classified.   
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court communications with the client given the proximity of military 
court security, and the lack of availability of interpreters for such 
purposes.
35
  Substantive and procedural defects continued to plague 
the military commissions, creating a stark distinction from the mun-
dane and inexorable progress of a federal criminal case of even the 
greatest magnitude. 
The nearly wholly uncharted proceedings that the commissions 
represented in 2004 (and for most purposes, through the middle of 
2006, until passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and the 
promulgation and implementation of a formal set of more compre-
hensive rules and procedures)
36
 offered experienced federal court 
practitioners three distinct advantages: (1) each particular deviation 
from federal court practice could be cited as a material deficiency in 
the commission system, (2) the standards and practices employed in 
federal court could be cited as preferable in those many instances in 
which the military commission rules and orders had failed to provide 
any guidance, and (3) when appropriate, the lack of any military 
commission rules or standards served as an opportunity to craft inno-
vative challenges or solutions that were based on and consistent with 
federal court practice. 
Federal practice standards were, of course, particularly useful 
with respect to distinguishing the critical fundamentals of the com-
missions from those present in the federal system.  Such standards in-
cluded (a) the composition of the commission (non-lawyers endowed 
with the responsibility for making legal determinations), (b) the pre-
ference for hearsay over direct testimony, (c) the problems with the 
substantive offenses (notably regarding jurisdiction and the ex post 
facto doctrine), and (d) the diminution of the defendant’s right to 
confront evidence. 
In addition, federal practice standards also contrasted with the 
commission in the context of Sixth Amendment standards regarding 
attorney-client confidentiality and the scope of the attorney-client 
privilege and access, the sequence of pretrial events (e.g., bifurcating 
 
 35 For example, during the initial proceedings, private interpreters (hired by the 
defense teams) sitting in the audience immediately challenged the accuracy of trans-
lations by the court interpreters.  Also, due to the small size of the courtroom, and 
the manner in which it had been reconfigured to accommodate the commissions, 
security personnel were situated so close to the defense table that it was very difficult 
to have even a whispered conversation with the defendant without the danger of it 
being overheard.  For those defendants who did not speak English, adding a third 
person—the interpreter—to the conversation made confidentiality impossible. 
 36 Pub. L. No 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, 
and 42 U.S.C.).   
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discovery motions from motions attacking the charging instrument 
from motions regarding evidentiary challenges), the range of re-
sources made available by the courts for the defense of indigent de-
fendants, and the handling of classified information.
37
  Moreover, the 
initial military commissions’ lack of rules and standards left so much 
uncovered that federal practice and military practice under the 
UCMJ served as the most likely and applicable analog.
38
  When, how-
ever, the attempt to import the methodology of those established sys-
tems into the military commissions was opposed by the prosecution 
and/or rejected by the military commission itself, it merely illumi-
nated the fatal flaws in the commissions system, including its resis-
tance to fairness in adjudicating the detainees’ cases. 
Ultimately there were too many such instances to catalogue 
completely; they accumulated on a continuing basis and severely un-
dercut the commissions’ claim to any legitimacy.  The repeated refer-
ences to federal practice and its superiority to the military commis-
sions substantively and procedurally (and in the context of orderly, 
predictable, reliable, and consistent proceedings and results) pro-
vided an invaluable template for challenging both the essence and 
operations of the commissions.  Experienced civilian practitioners, 
equipped with the depth of experience and who could with the ut-
most confidence point to and explain examples from federal court 
practice, were able to expose the inadequacies of the military com-
missions on a regular basis. 
IV. THE ADVANTAGES OF BEING A LAWYER IN THE MILITARY 
COMMISSIONS SYSTEM RATHER THAN IN HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 
Since military commission prosecutions commenced in early 
2004, which was before any lawyers representing detainees in habeas 
corpus proceedings were permitted to visit their clients at Guantá-
namo Bay,
39
 certain standards for military commission attorney access 
and conduct were already in place before the rules for habeas lawyers 
were formulated.  That prior access became a distinct advantage for 
lawyers operating in the military commissions who were subject to dif-
 
 37 See discussion infra Part V.  Traditional military justice under the UCMJ, 10 
U.S.C. §§ 801–941 (2006), also provided ample sources for comparison with the mili-
tary commissions, with the latter proving inadequate in nearly every respect. 
 38 Id.  
 39 See Biography of Gitanjali Gutierrez, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., 
http://ccrjustice.org/about-us/staff-board/gutierrez,-gitanjali (last visited Sept. 16, 
2011).  
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ferent rules, different treatment, and different recognition than the 
habeas lawyers. 
The criminal nature of the military commissions provided a 
strong basis for insisting on the charged detainees’ rights to counsel, 
the full protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege, and the 
protection of attorney work product.  Also, because the military 
commissions’ charges and the detailing of military defense counsel 
were referred
40
 before any habeas lawyers were allowed to visit their 
clients at Guantánamo Bay, defense counsel in the commissions were 
able to operate under the auspices of a criminal prosecution before 
any of the more restrictive provisions applying to habeas lawyers were 
imposed. 
Consequently, many of the restrictions under which habeas 
counsel were compelled to conduct their representation never ap-
plied to commissions’ defense counsel.  For example, during my re-
presentation of David (1) none of his statements to counsel were 
considered classified or embargoed in any way (other than initially 
with respect to the physical aspects of his confinement, but this re-
striction, too, vanished within a couple of months), (2) none of what 
he wrote was subject to any such restrictions, (3) there was no protec-
tive order with respect to communications or relations with the client 
(but rather only with respect to discovery provided by the prosecu-
tion), (4) none of the materials we provided or received from David 
were subject to any “privilege team” review, and (5) we were not sub-
ject to any formal limitations with respect to access to the client when 
we wished to visit.  Conversely, the habeas attorneys suffered under all 
of those constraints.
41
 
Even logistically there were benefits.  Civilian lawyers (and of 
course their military co-counsel) in the military commissions were 
permitted to reside on the “windward” side of the base, situated on 
the eastern side of Guantánamo Bay.  The windward side contained 
more resources and reduced travel time—including elimination of 
the ferry ride each morning and evening to the “leeward” side and 
back—to and from the detention camps, which were also located on 
the windward side.  Nor were civilian defense lawyers in the commis-
sions assigned personnel to accompany them everywhere.  Rather, 
Guantánamo base officials deemed military defense counsel suitable 
 
 40 “Referral” is simply the technical term for the process by which military 
charges are instituted against a defendant. 
 41 See, e.g., Josh White, Rules for Lawyers of Detainees Are Called Onerous, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 13, 2008, at A3 (“All mail from the lawyers to the detainees and from the detai-
nees to their attorneys is screened by a Defense Department Privilege Team . . . .”). 
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escorts.  Civilian defense lawyers in the commissions shared offices in 
the first commissions building with their military counterparts, which 
included access to telephones and the Internet.  These working con-
ditions enabled civilian defense lawyers in the commissions to use 
their time more productively and efficiently when not visiting clients 
at the detention camps. 
The more favorable conditions under which civilian defense law-
yers in the military commissions operated without any incident de-
monstrates that the disparate treatment of habeas counsel was purely 
arbitrary, unnecessary, and designed simply to impair the effective-
ness of those attorneys and their relationships with their detainee 
clients.  Unfortunately, as the revived commissions move forward, the 
Department of Defense (DoD), via its proposed protective order and 
directive to the military lawyers announcing DoD’s position that it 
can monitor all electronic and telephonic communications to and 
from the Office of Military Defense Counsel-Defense (OMC-D),
42
 is 
attempting to engraft the more restrictive treatment of lawyers in the 
civil habeas cases on to the defense attorneys in the military commis-
sions.  The purpose of such gratuitous rules, which are neither neces-
sary for national security nor for case management in the commis-
sions themselves, is transparent: to constrict and impair the defense 
function in the commissions.
43
 
V. THE ADVANTAGES OF FAMILIARITY WITH CLASSIFIED EVIDENCE 
PROCEDURES AND RULES 
The commissions initially lacked any formal or practical proto-
cols for handling classified information and evidence.  As a result, 
expertise in litigating under the Classified Information Procedures 
 
 42 See Dep’t of Def., Protective Order & Procedures for Counsel Access to Detai-
nees Subject to Military Commission Prosecution at the U.S. Naval Station in Guan-
tánamo Bay, Cuba (2011), available at 
http://www.talkleft.com/legal/militcommprotorder.pdf; Memorandum from Col. 
Jeffrey Colwell, Chief Mil. Def. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., on Objections to Protec-
tive Order and Procedure for Counsel Access of Mar. 4, 2011 (Mar. 15, 2011), availa-
ble at 
http://media.miamiherald.com/smedia/2011/03/19/14/CDC_PO_objections_15_
Mar_11.source.prod_affiliate.56.pdf. 
 43  It likely also represents the Obama administration seeking to mollify congres-
sional critics who, in 2010, passed an amendment (that failed in the Senate) requir-
ing DoD to investigate any lawyer who represented a Guantánamo Bay detainee and, 
inter alia, about whom there existed “reasonable suspicion” of having “interfered with 
the operations of the Department of Defense.”  Letter from Former Prosecutors and 
Judges to Senate Armed Servs. Comm. 1 (June 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/408.pdf.  See also H.R. REP. NO. 111-491, at 
367 (2011).   
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Act (CIPA),
44
 the statute that governs classified material and evidence 
in federal criminal prosecutions, was invaluable. 
Knowledge not only of CIPA’s procedural framework but also of 
the unblemished history of defense attorneys’ compliance with the 
confidentiality of classified information provided a firm and prin-
cipled basis for successfully resisting any restrictions on access or use 
of classified material that extended beyond what was permitted in the 
federal courts.  In addition, CIPA provided a template for offering 
common sense and reliable solutions that was absent from the mili-
tary commission rules.  As a result, defense counsel were able to op-
erate with confidence that—in the absence of commission rules on 
the subject—the manner in which we treated classified information 
and evidence was consistent with the law, conventional practice en-
dorsed by the federal courts, and national security.  Experience in li-
tigating cases involving classified information and evidence also aided 
civilian defense counsel with respect to proposed protective orders.  
Federal cases implicating classified information always
45
 include pro-
tective orders.
46
  To the extent the military commissions attempted to 
impose conditions in protective orders that were more stringent on 
defense counsel and defense preparation, we were able to point to 
the protective orders in federal cases—as well as the perfect record of 
protecting such information in federal court—as examples of ade-
quately protected classified information that did not unduly constrain 
defense preparation and investigation. 
VI. THE ADVANTAGES OF EXPERIENCE IN INVESTIGATING, PREPARING, 
AND LITIGATING COMPLEX, DOCUMENT-INTENSIVE, MULTI-DEFENDANT 
CASES 
Criminal prosecutions in the military justice system rarely involve 
more than one defendant, and among those, even rarer are complex, 
document-intensive cases—and by that term I mean a volume in the 
thousands, if not tens or hundreds of thousands, of pages.  Yet such 
prosecutions are commonplace in the federal courts, and in a variety 
of cases, including white-collar crime, terrorism, computer fraud, and 
 
 44 18 U.S.C. App. III, §§ 1–16 (2006). 
 45 CIPA makes such protective orders mandatory upon government motion.  Id. § 
3.  As a result, such motions are entered in every case involving classified informa-
tion. 
 46 See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 267 (4th Cir. 2010); Bismul-
lah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“At no time . . . may Petitioner’s 
Counsel make any public or private statements disclosing any classified information 
made available pursuant to this Protective Order.”).  
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identity theft.
47
  In addition, organized crime and gang cases, as well 
as terrorism cases, routinely involve extensive forensic evidence and 
expert testimony.
48
  Again, such cases are infrequent in the military 
justice system. 
Such cases are different in kind and degree not only because of 
the amount of discovery.  In addition, the scope of the necessary de-
fense investigation (involving not simply an act or discrete series of 
acts, but a transnational conspiracy over considerable time designed 
to achieve multiple criminal objectives and to commit manifold di-
verse offenses in the process), the preparation time required for trial 
readiness, the use of broad inchoate offenses (e.g., conspiracy and 
“material support” for terrorism), and the intricate legal issues that 
arise in the context of complex offenses and fact patterns, distinguish 
such cases from the ordinary prosecution.  These intricacies can also 
alter the dynamics among co-defendants and their counsel.  Many 
lawyers, even in the federal courts, are unfamiliar with joint defense 
agreements, joint strategy sessions, and harmonization of co-
defendants’ approaches to the case in a manner that denies the pros-
ecution use of its traditional “divide and conquer” blueprint. 
Multi-defendant cases present a minefield of opportunities for 
conflict among co-defendants and their tactical and strategic choices.  
While it is often challenging to reconcile contrasting interests among 
defendants—and their counsel’s theory of their defense—it is only in 
the rarest of instances that one defendant cannot achieve his strategic 
objective or engage in specific tactics without also fashioning it in a 
manner that avoids harming a co-defendant.  Nor is this simply altru-
ism; the benefits are reciprocal, as advance consideration of how a 
particular argument, exhibit, or cross-examination will affect a co-
defendant’s case is the best insurance against the opposite happening 
to your client.  Such consideration is contagious and encourages oth-
er counsel to preview parts of their case that might be harmful to 
other defendants. 
The key is communication among counsel and with the defen-
dants both individually and as a group.  A defense that is not cohesive 
and involves counsel who, through either obliviousness, carelessness, 
 
 47 See, e.g., United States v. White, No. 06-377-1, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60778, at 
*18 n.6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2007) (“This case involves ten defendants and twenty-two 
counts . . . and aggravated identity theft.  The indictment describes seventy-five dif-
ferent transactions . . . .  Discovery included thousands of documents . . . .”).   
 48  See, e.g., United States v. Sabir, No. S4 05 Cr. 673, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34372 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (involving expert testimony for charges pertaining to material sup-
port to a foreign terrorist organization). 
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or worse, disparage other defendants more often than not inures to 
the detriment of all defendants in a multi-defendant trial, including 
the attorneys who engage in such tactics.  In fact, it is one of the chief 
ancillary advantages enjoyed by the prosecution in a multi-defendant 
case. 
Yet regular and continued communication among counsel can 
diminish the negative effects in such cases.  For example, legal issues 
advanced by one defendant can have a significantly better chance of 
success than if presented by another defendant (because either the 
factual context or some other aspect favors one defendant over 
another).  Also, the timing in which issues are raised can also be criti-
cal and can benefit from joint discussion so that the benefits are max-
imized for all defendants.  Language of argument or cross-
examination can be structured so that it accomplishes its goal but 
minimizes or eliminates altogether the harm to another defendant.  
Cross-examination can also be divided not only to share ideas and to 
reduce each counsel’s workload, but also to allocate to each counsel 
areas of cross-examination that most benefit their client (and, in 
turn, transfer to other counsel areas that are of use to them or which 
would benefit the client more if aired by a different defendant).  As a 
cooperative venture, a whole defense in a multi-defendant case is far 
greater than the sum of its parts. 
None of that is possible, however, if counsel fail or are unwilling 
to communicate.  Experience in these types of cases—whether in se-
curities or other white-collar cases, organized crime racketeering 
prosecutions, or large-scale drug cases—is sobering, as both exem-
plary and awful examples at each extreme provide the best lessons for 
future practice and sear into memory the consequences of a balka-
nized defense and the geometric advantages of striving to find stra-
tegic and tactical common ground. 
Yet military counsel were almost all completely unexposed to 
such cases and to the culture of a joint defense.  Also, while the first 
four commissions cases back in 2004 were charged as single-
defendant cases,
49
 it was clear that they would proceed in many re-
spects as a multi-defendant case.  The only judicial officer on each 
commission was the same, and the cases were heard in series over 
consecutive days.
50
  Thus, whichever case went first would set the tone 
in many respects for the cases that followed.  As a result, knowing 
 
 49 See Challenges for Cause Decision, supra note 29. 
 50 See John Mintz, Presiding Officer at Guantánamo Faces Questions, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 16, 2004, at A3 (noting that the was Army Colonel Peter E. Brownback III pre-
sided over all four cases).  
DRATEL_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2011  2:39 PM 
1354 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1339 
which issues might be important to the next defendant, even if not 
integral to the client’s case, would influence how a particular issue 
might be presented in order not to minimize the importance of that 
other issue, which is vital to the co-defendant.  Also, again, if a partic-
ular defendant’s circumstances strengthened his chances on a certain 
issue, it would be prudent for counsel to recognize that that defen-
dant’s counsel should be afforded the opportunity to emphasize that 
issue.
51
 
Obviously, these are not matters taught in law school—even in 
clinical programs, which correctly concentrate on developing indi-
vidual lawyering skills.  Nor are these matters recognized or cultivated 
in a system that handles almost exclusively single-defendant cases 
charged with individual offenses narrowly defined in time and scope.  
Such matters are second nature, though, to lawyers with extensive 
experience in federal court practice.
52
 
VII. THE ADVANTAGES OF A CLIENT-ORIENTED, RATHER THAN  
CAUSE-ORIENTED, APPROACH 
A criminal defense attorney’s horizon is usually limited to one 
client’s objectives in a particular case.  That, after all, is the mandate: 
zealous, un-conflicted representation of the client—in the singular, 
and not the plural.  Yet in the context of Guantánamo Bay, the 
“cause” could also serve as a distraction, as the inclination to view the 
detainees—their identities hidden for so long and their individuality 
denied as a consequence—as a unitary entity was powerful.  Add to 
that dynamic the multiple representation of detainees in the habeas 
cases, and as a result, the obligation to the specific client could easily 
be obscured. 
Also, the commentary regarding Guantánamo Bay, whether in 
the media, or from academics, politicians, or legal and human rights 
 
 51 A corresponding advantage in the military commissions was that it was unclear 
whether the military prosecutors’ experience was broader than their military defense 
counterparts’.  As a result, those prosecutors did not exploit the multi-defendant 
context nearly as often or effectively as civilian prosecutors.  For example, the initial 
cases were charged individually even though the defendants were charged with what 
a civilian prosecutor would recognize as the same conspiracy and would consequent-
ly present in the same indictment charging multiple defendants.  
 52 Conversely, the diverse nature of a federal practice afforded civilian defense 
counsel ample preparation for learning unfamiliar areas of law such as the Laws of 
Armed Conflict, the Geneva Convention, international humanitarian law, and the 
procedural and substantive elements of the UCMJ.  Absorbing those doctrines simply 
replicated what occurs in the course of federal practice, which requires criminal de-
fense counsel to master, over time and in considerable detail, securities law, tax law, 
construction law, banking law, and other areas of law that arise in particular cases. 
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organizations, invariably treated the detainees’ circumstances en 
masse—as a unitary legal or human rights issue
53
—even though de-
tainees often faced individual problems and possessed different in-
terests and priorities.  That grouping of the detainees, facilitated by 
the U.S. government’s refusal to identify the detainees
54
 (and its ear-
lier tactical decision not to confine any U.S. citizens at Guantánamo 
Bay,
55
 thereby effectively eliminating the U.S. public at large as an in-
terested party), made it convenient, even seductive, to transfer that 
more abstract approach to the representation of individual detainees 
in their criminal military commissions prosecutions. 
Again, though, the culture of criminal defense lawyering in the 
U.S. criminal justice system acted as a bulwark against that division of 
interest.  While in civil litigation multiple representation is permitted, 
and is often efficient if the interests of the clients converge, the gen-
eral rule is the opposite in the U.S. federal criminal justice system: 
one client per lawyer.
56
  That limitation guards against viewing too 
broadly the attorney’s role and duty, which is to the individual client 
only.
57
  Having more than one client per lawyer was a persistent issue 
regarding representation in the military commissions as the detai-
nees, and the commissions themselves, were the subject of an ongo-
ing political debate that often transcended individual cases and the 
important issues at stake for each detainee defendant.  Although it 
may have been tempting to treat the conditions at Guantánamo Bay 
and the structure of the military commissions as grounds for a 
“cause” on the detainees’ behalf, in the context of a criminal prose-
cution, that would be as misguided as it would be contrary to ethical 
obligations.  Treating the two as grounds for a cause would have jeo-
 
 53 See, e.g., E.A. Torriero, Guantánamo Braces for Change, CHI. TRIBUNE, July 12, 
2004, at 1 (noting human rights groups’ criticism).  
 54 See President Makes Recess Selections, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Pa.), Jan. 5, 
2006, at A-8 (discussing media efforts to uncover the identities of the detainees)  
 55 See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, The Questions the Court Will Consider, USA TODAY, Apr. 
19, 2004, at 13A (noting that a U.S. citizen “was transferred to a military brig in the 
USA when officials realized” this fact).  
 56 See, e.g., United States v. Curcio, 786 F.2d 52 (1986) (discussing dangers arising 
from multiple representation); Rory K. Little, A Roundtable Discussion of the ABA’s 
Standards for Criminal Litigation: The Role of Reporter for a Law Project, 38 HASTINGS. 
CONST. L.Q. 747, 794 (2011) (noting that defense counsel should generally refrain 
from representing “two or more clients in criminal cases”). 
 57 That principle is not incompatible with the points made supra, Part VII.  The 
justification for coordination and cooperation among co-defendants and their coun-
sel is to achieve the best results for the individual client.  The preference for joint 
defense strategy and communication merely recognizes that a unified approach is 
most advantageous for each client. 
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pardized obtaining the best results for the individual client.  Indeed, 
if, as David’s lawyers, we would have considered as a priority the 
broader goal of invalidating the military commissions in their entire-
ty, we would not have been able to capitalize on the opportunity for a 
disposition that resulted in David’s return to Australia sixty days later 
and his freedom within six months thereafter.  If David had not 
pleaded guilty, but instead waited for (another) defeat of the military 
commission system,
58
 he would likely still be at Guantánamo Bay, 
“presumed” innocent but still awaiting trial in the fifth incarnation of 
a failed and illegitimate system.
59
 
In the criminal justice system, justice most often must be 
achieved one defendant at a time, and deviating from that principle 
often precludes both aims: the client gets convicted, and the cause is 
not advanced, either.  For Guantánamo Bay, too, the concept is the 
same: it now appears, given President Obama’s unwillingness and/or 
inability to shutter the facility, that the detention operation will only 
be closed one detainee at a time, through individual cases in the mili-
tary commissions and habeas petitions that gain a detainee’s release. 
VIII.    THE ADVANTAGES OF A GLOBAL AUDIENCE 
The attention paid to Guantánamo Bay detainees by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), international (and, over time, 
domestic) media, organized bar associations, and academics in the 
United States and abroad created an atmosphere conducive to pres-
suring the military commissions apparatus by appeals to those au-
diences.  Because the purpose, structure, and operation of the mili-
tary commissions were so transparently political, the commissions 
were naturally quite sensitive to political pressure.  Thus, media, aca-
demic, and NGO criticism of the military commissions exerted an 
impact on the commissions far greater than would have been the case 
in the federal courts, which, although not entirely immune to influ-
ence from those quarters, are far more insulated from it. 
The global audience also provided the lawyers available outlets 
for their message on a daily basis, as there was never a shortage of re-
porters, professors, and NGOs anxious for information about the 
 
 58 Although David’s case was still relatively early in its pretrial phase when the 
Supreme Court decided Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006), the Court’s 
rejection of the military commissions did not free David.  All the ruling did was leave 
David in continued limbo pending Congress’s attempt to gloss over the commissions’ 
inadequacies via the Military Commission Act of 2006. 
 59 In early 2011, there were “172 detainees remaining [in Guantánamo], 48 of 
whom are expected to be held indefinitely.” Glenn Kessler, Takes Factchecker Banner 
with GK Mug, WASH. POST, May 22, 2011, at A6.    
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Guantánamo Bay detainees and their legal struggles in both the mili-
tary commissions and habeas corpus process.  Also, once the military 
commissions commenced and their deficiencies were apparent, sting-
ing editorials from U.S. newspapers placed the commissions on the 
defensive.
60
  That posture only aggravated the problem for the com-
missions, as cosmetic changes or reforms were recognized as such 
and further eroded the military commissions’ credibility. 
Experience in high-profile cases in the U.S. courts obviously 
provided defense lawyers excellent training for this aspect of the mili-
tary commissions, although the scope and volume of the attention 
vastly exceeded all but the highest profile cases—and with respect to 
academic and NGO interest, it was unprecedented for criminal pro-
ceedings.  While it is a myth that the media can be “controlled,” even 
by the most skilled lawyer, experience does provide guidance on how 
to maximize the advantages of media interest in a case for the client’s 
benefit—steadfastly keeping in mind that the only objective is im-
proving the client’s chances and not aggrandizement of the attor-
ney’s media profile or reputation. 
Criminal cases are rarely won by appealing to an audience out-
side the jury box or judge’s bench, but with respect to the Guantá-
namo Bay military commissions, the global audience and its enduring 
fascination with all things Guantánamo created a fertile environment 
for successfully challenging the military commissions and revealing its 
many flaws. 
IX. THE ADVANTAGE OF HAVING THE RIGHT CLIENT 
An additional advantage was not the result of federal court expe-
rience as a defense lawyer.  Rather, it was simply good fortune to have 
David as a client.  The absence of a language barrier, the relative lack 
of any cultural barrier (Australian cultural mores are close enough to 
American, Vegimite
61 and “football” aside), and the ability to engage 
in regular contact with David’s family all combined to make establish-
ing the essentials of a productive attorney-client relationship—trust, 
confidence, and candor
62
—a relatively effortless process. 
 
 60 See, e.g., Editorial, The President and the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2006, at A22.  
 61 Vegimite is a popular Australian dark brown food paste made from yeast ex-
tract.   
 62 While these three elements are all related, they are in fact different.  Trust in-
volves believing what the other person says and that person’s bona fides(in this in-
stance, counsel acting in the best interest of the client, and the client’s agenda being 
transparent).  Confidence, on the other hand, involves the client listening to the law-
yer’s advice and making prudent decisions based on the belief that such advice has 
merit.  Candor, in which lawyer and client provide their honest assessment of the 
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For many other lawyers, particularly military lawyers without the 
aid of civilian counsel, the suspicion and distrust detainees harbored 
with respect to uniformed U.S. officers was difficult to overcome and 
created initial obstacles that we never encountered with David.  Also, 
without doubt, some of the advantages described above, particularly 
the lack of any “competition” at the outset, enabled us to accomplish 
certain objectives for David that increased his confidence in our abili-
ty to achieve our more important goals in the commissions them-
selves. 
Throughout the period of representation, David was an engaged 
and informed client, an avid student of both the system to which he 
was subjected and other subjects—English literature, science, and 
math, for example—that due to his lack of extensive formal educa-
tion had not previously been accessible to him.  He handled the chal-
lenging circumstances of his confinement and prosecution with great 
resilience, perseverance, and humor, without which probably none of 
the advantages discussed in this Essay would have mattered much at 
all. 
The point of this Essay is not to suggest that for experienced 
federal practitioners these advantages make the military commissions 
a venue superior to federal courts, but instead that those who prac-
tice in the federal courts and state a preference for federal court 
prosecutions of Guantánamo Bay detainees (and apprehended al-
leged terrorists generally) do not do so because of some inability to 
navigate the military commissions.  Rather, it is based on the belief 
that the federal courts constitute a legitimate system in which justice 
is at least possible and the design of which is not merely to guarantee 
convictions. 
Indeed, proponents of military commissions who see them as a 
barrel in which to prosecute alleged terrorist fish should be aware 
that the fundamental defects in the military commissions provide 
substantial opportunity for experienced civilian defense practition-
ers—which is perhaps why the government has thus far refused to 
fund the participation of civilian defense counsel in the commissions.  
As a Department of Justice (DoJ) lawyer reportedly declared during a 
high-level internal DoJ strategy session shortly after September 11, 
2001, regarding affording Muslim detainees in federal civilian custo-
dy timely access to counsel, “Let’s not make it so they can get Johnny 
 
facts, the circumstances, and each other, stems from the foundation of both trust 
and confidence.  All three are imperative for an effective attorney-client relationship. 
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Cochran on the phone.”
63
  While unfortunately Mr. Cochran is de-
ceased, the spirit of vigorous, innovative, and intelligent defense la-
wyering lives on. 
 
 
 63  See STEVEN BRILL, AFTER: HOW AMERICA CONFRONTED THE SEPTEMBER 12 ERA 147 
(2003). 
